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Cox: Travel: The Evolution of a Penumbral Right.

TRAVEL: THE EVOLUTION OF A
PENUMBRAL RIGHT
CYNTHIA HOLLINGSWORTH COX
Freedom of mobility is a fundamental right, and the importance of this
right is coming more and more into the foreground in our modem fluid society. This right to move freely has always been thought to be and is now
more than ever inextricably linked with the right to associate, converse, and
assemble with others. Even though some courts find this objectionable, it
is nonetheless accorded the same protection as preferred freedoms. The
right is shielded against oblique infringement as well as direct interference
and restrictions on the right are permissible only when an overriding interest
is shown. As significant as the right to travel is, there has been no homogeneity of opinion as to its source, nature or scope.
SOURCE OF THE RIGHT

The right to travel emerged in Anglo-Saxon times at least as early as the
Magna Carta. Article 42, a result of the reaction against royal restriction of
free mobility, allowed every free man to leave England except during time of
war. Keeping in mind that many of the civil liberties as we know them today
-the freedom of speech, worship and assembly-are not enumerated in
the Magna Carta, it is notable that mobility was considered so significant.'
This strong and steadfast desire of Englishmen for freedom of movement
was carried to the colonies and bitter resentment was created when it was
frustrated by the distant government in London.2 One of the potent motivations for independence was the determination of Americans to be masters of
their own freedom of movement. 3 Article IV of the Articles of Confederation
provided that "the people shall have free ingress and regress to and from any
other state . . . ." This right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution,
perhaps because a liberty so basic was conceived to be a necessary concomi4
tant of the stronger union the Constitution created.
Despite the absence of specific mention in the Constitution, the right to
travel received early and recurrent recognition by the courts as a constitu1. Jaffee, The Right to Travel: The PassportProblem, 35 FOREIGN AFFARS 17, 19

(1956).
2. Z. CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 187
(1956).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 185. It has been suggested that such liberty was viewed as an unquestionable right and that something was assumed rather than rejected. Gould, The
Right to Travel and National Security, 1961 WAsH. U.L.Q. 334.
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tional right. Although there is no conflict over the existence of the right,
there has been little accord as to the specific provision supporting it. The
sources that have been proffered are the privileges and immunities clauses of
article IV and the fourteenth amendment, the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, the commerce clause of article I and a general unwritten premise
of the Constitution.
The first judicial recognition of the right to travel in the United States was
by way of dictum in Corfield v. Coryell.6 The court characterized the right
of free ingress and regress as one of the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens under Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution. 6 The Passenger Cases,7 which involved taxes levied on alien passengers arriving in the
United States, was the first opportunity for a member of the Supreme Court
to approach the subject. Chief Justice Taney, while not considering this an
appropriate instance to apply the right to travel principles, pointed out in his
dissent that the right to travel was inherent in the Constitution.
For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was
formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same community,
must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without
interruption, as freely as in our own States.8
In Crandall v. Nevada,9 the Court, in its first attempt to deal directly with
the right to free movement, invalidated a Nevada tax on every person leaving
the state by common carrier because it interfered with the right to travel.
Taney's statements in the Passenger Cases accorded with the inferences this
Court drew from the Constitution, and the right to travel was again attributed to the privileges and immunities clause of article IV. 10 Later the Court
5. 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
6. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities
of Citizens in the several States ....
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state,
for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise . . . may be
mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which
are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental ....
Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). However,
the court held that this right did not preclude a state from statutorily excluding persons from another state to rake for oysters since the oyster beds belonged to the
state of New Jersey.
7. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 12 L. Ed. 702 (1849).
8. Id. at 492, 12 L. Ed. at 790 (dissenting opinion). Noting that the Constitution was designed to "secure the freest intercourse between the citizens of different
States," Taney also felt that article IV, section 2 was the source of this right. Id.
at 492, 12 L. Ed. at 790; accord, Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180, 19
L. Ed. 357, 360 (1869).
9. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 18 L. Ed. 745 (1868).
10. Id. at 43-44, 18 L. Ed. at 747; accord, Hague v. GIO, 307 U.S. 496, 59 S. Ct.
954, 83 L. Ed. 1423 (1939); Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525, 40 S. Ct. 2, 63 L.
Ed. 1124 (1919); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 20 L. Ed. 449 (1871).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol5/iss1/6

2

Cox: Travel: The Evolution of a Penumbral Right.

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5: 84

acknowledged that the purpose of the privileges and immunities provision of
Article IV of the Articles of Confederation and the purpose of Article IV,
Section 2 of the Constitution were the same. 1 Even though Article IV of
the Articles of Confederation specifically mentioned various privileges and immunities, including the right of free ingress and egress, whereas Article IV,
Section 2 of the Constitution merely contained a general reference to the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states, the privileges and
12
immunities intended were identical.
Other decisions referring to the right to travel as a privilege and immunity
base its constitutional origin on the fourteenth amendment. 13 As stated by
4
the Court in Williams v. Fears:1

Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one

place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal lib-

erty, and the right, ordinarily, of, free transit from or through the territory of any State is a right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and
by other provisions of the Constitution. 1"
Justice Douglas stated in Edwards v. California"6 that a citizen's right to migrate from place to place is an unlimited one based on the fourteenth amendment. In his concurring opinion he remarked:
[W]hen the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868, it had been
squarely and authoritatively settled that the right to move freely from
State to State was a right of nationalcitizenship. As such it was protecclause of the Fourteenth Amendted by the privileges and immunities
7
ment against state interference.'
11. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75, 21 L. Ed. 394, 408 (1872).
12. Id. Other cases have recognized that the privileges and immunities clause of
article IV, section 2 secures the right of citizens of one state to pass through or reside
in another state for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits or otherwise
without being subjected to treatment more onerous than the citizens of that state.
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927); Shaffer v.
Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 40 S. Ct. 221, 64 L. Ed. 445 (1920).
13. . . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws ....
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. 179 U.S. 270, 21 S. Ct. 128, 45 L. Ed. 186 (1900).
15. Id. at 274, 21 S. Ct. at 129, 45 L. Ed. at 188; accord, Colgate v. Harvey,
296 U.S. 404, 430, 56 S. Ct. 252, 259, 80 L. Ed. 299, 311 (1935), overruled on other
grounds, Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 60 S. Ct. 411, 84 L. Ed. 590 (1940);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97, 29 S. Ct. 14, 19, 53 L. Ed. 97, 105 (1908),
overruled on other grounds, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 12 L. Ed. 2d
653 (1963).
16. 314 U.S. 160, 62 S. Ct. 164, 86 L. Ed. 119 (1941) (concurring opinion).
17. Id. at 179, 62 S. Ct. at 169, 86 L. Ed. at 128 (court's emphasis). Douglas
relied on this opinion in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 519, 84 S. Ct.
1659, 1671, 12 L. Ed. 2d 992, 1005 (1964) where he again insisted that the right
to move freely was a privilege and immunity of national citizenship. Justice Jackson
felt that the Court in Edwards should
hold squarely that it is a privilege of citizenship of the United States, protected
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The right to travel has at times been considered secured by the commerce
clause of article I, section 8,18 subject to control by Congress but free from
impairment by the states. In Edwards the majority held that a California
law, which prohibited assistance to nonresident indigents entering the state,
was unconstitutional in that it impeded free interstate passage of the indigent. 19 The Court in United States v. Guest 20 said that it is well settled that
"the federal commerce power authorizes Congress to legislate for the protec-

tion of individuals from violations of civil rights that impinge on their free
21
movement in interstate commerce."
The word "liberty" in the due process clause of the fifth amendment has
also been cited as the source of the right to mobility. 22 The Supreme Court
recognized in Kent v. Dulles23 that "[t]he right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be denied without due process of law
....
"24
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Aptheker v. Secretary
25
of State affirmed the principle that freedom of travel is an inalienable right
guaranteed by the due process clause by stating that the freedom to travel

outside the United States is a liberty protected by the fifth amendment. 26

from state abridgment, to enter any state of the Union, either for temporary
sojourn or for the establishment of permanent residence therein and for gaining
resultant citizenship thereof. If national citizenship means less than this, it means
nothing at all.
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 183, 62 S. Ct. 164, 171, 86 L. Ed. 119, 130
(1941) (concurring opinion); accord, Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 285, 91 S.
Ct. 260, 345, 27 L. Ed. 2d 272, 374 (1970) (concurring opinion).
18. "The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States .... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
19. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 62 S. Ct. 164, 86 L. Ed. 119 (1941).
20. 383 U.S. 745, 86 S. Ct. 1170, 16 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1966).
21. Id. at 759, 86 S. Ct. at 1178, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 250. Other opinions have relied on the commerce clause as the source of the right to travel. E.g., Helson v.
Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 251, 49 S. Ct. 279, 281, 73 L. Ed. 683, 687 (1929); Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 125 U.S. 465, 480-81, 8 S. Ct. 689, 695-96, 31 L. Ed.
700, 705 (1888); Philadelphia & S.S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326, 329, 7
S. Ct. 1118, 1121, 30 L. Ed. 1200, 1203 (1887).
22. "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ...... U.S. Const. amend. V.
23. 357 U.S. 116, 78 S. Ct. 1113, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1204 (1958).
24. Id. at 125, 78 S. Ct. at 1118, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 1210, citing Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160, 62 S. Ct. 164, 86 L. Ed. 119 (1941); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 35, 18 L. Ed. 744 (1867).
25. 378 U.S. 500, 84 S. Ct. 1659, 12 L. Ed. 2d 992 (1964).
26. Id. at 505-06, 525, 84 S. Ct. at 1663, 1674, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 997, 1009. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 671, 89 S. Ct. 1322,
1350, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600, 637 (1969), relied on the language in Kent, which was
echoed in Aptheker, and concluded that the right to interstate travel is a fundamental
right which has its source in the due process clause of the fifth amendment. This
viewpoint has been recently restated in Woodward v. Rogers, 344 F. Supp. 974
(D.D.C. 1972) where a federal district court held that the mandatory requirement
that all applicants for United States passports swear to or affirm an oath of allegiance
violated the right of travel protected by the fifth amendment. See also Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1, 14, 85 S. Ct. 1271, 1279, 14 L. Ed. 2d 179, 188 (1965).
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The mode of defining the right to travel has varied almost from case to
case. Many decisions, especially the recent ones, have either suggested
that freedom of mobility rests on an unwritten premise of the Constitution
or have considered it unnecessary to base the right on any particular constitutional provision. 27 It was recognized in Guest that the right to free ingress and egress to and from any other state found no explicit mention in
the Constitution, but nevertheless was a basic right under our Constitution. 28
In Shapiro v. Thompson the Court stated that
the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or
regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement. 29
However, the Court specifically refused to ascribe the source of the right to
travel to any particular constitutional provision.3 0 It was stated in Oregon
v. Mitchell3" that for more than a century the Court had recognized that all
citizens have the constitutional right to unhindered travel. The existence of
this right and its fundamental importance to our federal union was said to
have been established beyond question, but again the Court did not rely upon
one particular constitutional provision.3 2 Freedom of mobility has been
so firmly established and repeatedly recognized that its specific origin is
27. Perhaps this is the best approach. Since the right to travel has been repeatedly recognized by the Supreme Court, the question of its source may be purely
academic.
28.
Although there have been recurring differences in emphasis within the
Court as to the source of the constitutional right of interstate travel, there is no
need here to canvass those differences further. All have agreed that the right
exists.
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759, 86 S. Ct. 1170, 1179, 16 L. Ed. 2d 239,
250 (1966).
29. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 1329, 22 L. Ed. 2d
600, 612 (1969).
30. Id. at 630, 89 S. Ct. at 1329, 22 L. Ed. 2d at 612. Likewise the Court in Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S. Ct. 995, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1972), cited a host of
cases which have upheld the right to travel as a constitutionally protected right but
did not attribute this right to any specific provision of the Constitution. Accord,
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91 S. Ct. 1848, 29 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1971), a! 'g
313 F. Supp. 34 (D. Ariz. 1970).
31. 400 U.S. 112, 237-38, 91 S. Ct. 260, 321, 27 L. Ed. 2d 272, 346 (1970)
(concurring opinion).
32. While Justice Black announced the judgments of the Court in an opinion expressing his own views, there was no majority opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell. Justice Harlan called the right to travel a nebulous judicial construct. Id. at 216, 91
S. Ct. at 310, 27 L. Ed. 2d at 333. Justices Brennan, Marshall and White do not
attach the right of interstate travel to any specific constitutional provision. Id. at
237-38, 91 S. Ct. at 321, 27 L. Ed. 2d at 346; accord, Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88, 91 S. Ct. 1790, 29 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1971). Justice Douglas, dissenting in
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 233, 91 S. Ct. 1940, 1949, 29 L. Ed. 2d 438, 449
(1971) recognized that the right to travel from state to state, though not specifically
mentioned in the Constitution, had been deemed so elementary to our way of life that
it had been labeled a basic right.
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evidently unimportant. The right to travel has been protected regardless of
'33
what was said to be its basis because "whatever the source, the right exists."
NATURE OF THE RIGHT

There is a common understanding that the concepts of liberty and citizenship embraced the right of freedom of movement, the effective right to travel
freely. 34 Controversy has loomed regarding the nature of this right, as well
as its origin, but even so, the last 15 years have seen a growth in its significance.
Associationwith PreferredFreedoms
Perhaps the greatest amplification of the right to travel was its association
with first amendment freedoms. The Court took the initial step in Kent v.
Dulles35 where it was recognized:
Freedom of movement across frontiers in either direction, and inside
frontiers as well, was a part of our heritage. Travel abroad, like travel
within the country, may be

. .

.as close to the heart of the individual as

the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of movement
is basic in our scheme of values.386
The next step was Aptheker v. Secretary of State37 where the Court, following Kent, directly related travel to first amendment freedoms.
Since freedom of association is itself guaranteed in the First Amendment,
restrictions imposed upon the right to travel cannot be dismissed by asserting that the right to travel could be fully exercised if3 8the individual
would first yield up his membership in a given association.
Furthermore, this right of mobility "is the very essence of our free society,
setting us apart. Like the right of assembly and the right of association, it
often makes all other rights meaningful . .

.,39

Since travel was said to be closely related to other personal liberties pro40
tected by the first amendment, it inherited the same special protection.
33. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405
U.S. 707, -, 92 S. Ct. 1349, 1359, 31 L. Ed. 2d 620, 633 (1972) (Douglas, J.,dissenting).
34. Whatever is the nature of this right, aliens lawfully within this country may
enter and abide in any state on an equality of legal privileges with all citizens.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377-78, 91 S. Ct. 1848, 1855, 29 L. Ed. 2d 534,

545 (1971). However, nonresident, unadmitted aliens have no constitutional right of
entry to this country as a nonimmigrant or otherwise. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753, -,

92 S. Ct. 2576, 2581, 33 L. Ed. 2d 683, 691 (1972).

35. 357 U.S. 116, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 2L.Ed.2d 1204 (1958).
36. Id. at 126, 78 S.Ct. at 1118, 2 L.Ed. 2d at 1210.

37. 378 U.S. 500, 84 S. Ct. 1659, 12 L. Ed.2d 992 (1964).

38. Id.at 507, 84 S.Ct. at 1664, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 998.
39. Id. at 520, 84 S. Ct. at 1671, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 1006 (concurring opinion).
40. Ithas been said that inAptheker the right to travel was accidentally made a
corollary to preferred freedoms since there were questions regarding first amendment

liberties involved. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 649, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 1339,
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Thus a more potent doctrine was created since, as a result, a restriction on
travel may be challenged on its face.
Assertion Against Private Citizens
Freedom of mobility was further defined in United States v. Guest4I where
the Court specifically allowed enforcement of the right against private citizens. Stating that travel is a freedom that the Constitution itself guarantees,
the majority included in this freedom the right to preclude interference from
private individuals. Pointing out that the cases they had relied on in their
decision dealt with
governmental interference with the right of free interstate travel, their
reasoning fully supports the conclusion that the constitutional right of interstate travel is a right secured against interference
from any source
42

whatever, whether governmental or private.

As a result of Guest, there is a federally guaranteed right to be free from pri43
vate interference with interstate transit.
22 L. Ed. 2d 600, 624 (1969) (dissenting opinion); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16,
85 S. Ct. 1271, 1280, 14 L. Ed. 2d 179, 190 (1965). Therefore travel should not
receive the same protection as first amendment rights. Id. at 16, 85 S. Ct. at 1280,
14 L. Ed. 2d at 190. However, in the concurring and dissenting opinions in Aptheker,
reference was made to travel and first amendment freedoms. Justice Douglas said
that the right to travel is within the penumbra of the first amendment. Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 520, 84 S. Ct. 1659, 1671, 12 L. Ed. 2d 992, 1005
(1964) (concurring opinion), and Justice Clark based his dissent on the premise that
travel did not require the same protection as preferred freedoms. Id. at 522, 84
S. Ct. at 1672, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 1007. Furthermore, in Zemel, Justice Goldberg, who
had written the majority opinion in Aptheker, explained his previous opinion and defined travel as an "activity closely connected with the First Amendment .... "
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 38, 85 S. Ct. 1271, 1292, 14 L. Ed. 2d 179, 202 (1965)
(dissenting opinion). Therefore it seems highly unlikely that the association was an
accident.
41. 383 U.S. 745, 86S. Ct. 1170, 16 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1966).
42. Id. at 759 n.17, 86 S. Ct. at 1179 n.17, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 250 n.17. It was also
mentioned that "[w]hile past cases do indeed establish that there is a constitutional
'right to travel' between States free from unreasonable governmental interference, [this]
decision is the first to hold that such movement is also protected against private interference .... ." Id. at 763, 86 S. Ct. at 1181, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 252 (dissenting opinion)
(court's emphasis).
43. Id. See also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 S. Ct. 1790, 29 L. Ed.
2d 338 (1971) which involved a conspiracy to prevent Negroes from exercising their
rights to travel the public highways without restraint in the same manner as white
citizens in Mississippi. But see United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 41 S. Ct.
133, 65 L. Ed. 270 (1920) where the Court affirmed a judgment quashing an indictment for violation of a federal statute making it a crime to injure, oppress, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured
to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States. The indictment charged
that the defendants had held 221 persons in a boxcar in Arizona until they were
transported out of the state and released in New Mexico and warned never to return.
The Court concluded that the right of free ingress and egress was protected solely from
governmental action and not from private action. Id. at 298, 41 S. Ct. at 135, 65 L.
Ed. at 275 (emphasis added). In Guest the Court stated that Wheeler involved an
alleged conspiracy to compel residents of Arizona to move out of that state and
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Protectionas a PreferredFreedom
Kent, Aptheker, and Guest are significant because they extended the force
of the right to travel doctrine; Shapiro v. Thompson14 is important because it
further stressed the quality of the right. The Supreme Court in Shapiro relied on the right to interstate travel as the basis for its decision to strike down
statutes which denied welfare benefits to persons who had not been domiciled in the state for 1 year preceding application for benefits. The majority held that the 1-year waiting period discouraged poor people from moving into the state and that the "purpose of deterring the in-migration of indigents cannot serve as justification for the classification created by the oneyear waiting period, since that purpose is constitutionally impermissible. '' 45
The Court rejected the argument that showing a rational relationship between the waiting period and state objectives would suffice to justify denying welfare benefits to otherwise eligible applicants solely because they have
recently moved into the jurisdiction.
[I] moving from State to State or to the District of Columbia appellees
were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves
to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional. 46
Shapiro has made it clear-whether or not the right to travel is analogous
to first amendment freedoms, it will receive the same protection. Since the
classification of welfare applicants according to whether they had lived in
the state for 1 year touched on the fundamental right of interstate movement,
its constitutionality was judged on whether it promoted a compelling state
interest.47 This was the first time that the Supreme Court made compulsory
the compelling governmental interest test where a particular regulation
places a penalty on the right to travel. This standard requires that, upon a
prima facie showing of a burden on the exercise of a fundamental right, the
Wheeler was restricted to its own facts. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759
n.16, 86 S. Ct. 1170, 1179 n.16, 16 L. Ed. 239, 250 n.16 (1966). However, it seems
that Guest effectively overruled Wheeler.
44. 394 U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969).
45. Id. at 631, 89 S. Ct. at 1329, 22 L. Ed. 2d at 613.
46. Id. at 634, 89 S.Ct. at 1331, 22 L. Ed. 2d at 615 (court's emphasis).
47. The test ordinarily applied is whether or not the restriction bears a rational
relationship to the accomplishment of a permissible objective. See Turner v. Fouche,
396 U.S. 346, 362, 90 S.Ct. 532, 541, 24 L. Ed. 2d 567, 580 (1970); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 1104-05, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393, 398-99
(1961). The challenged law is entitled to a presumption of validity and is allowed to
stand unless it is shown that there is no rational basis for the means selected. Bullock
v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, -, 92 S. Ct. 849, 855-56, 31 L. Ed. 2d 92, 99-100 (1972).
But where the right involved is a fundamental .personal liberty, the restriction is
measured by a more rigid standard. The burden is on its proponents to show that the
restriction imposed is "necessary to protect a compelling and substantial governmental
interest." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 341, 92 S.Ct. 995, 1002, 31 L. Ed. 2d
274, 283 (1972). The challenged law must be precisely tailored to the objective.
Id. at 360, 92 S. Ct. at 1012, 31 L. Ed. 2d at 294.
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government justify the regulation imposing the burden with more than a rational relation to a legitimate governmental interest. It is not sufficient to
show that the particular legislation furthers a very substantial state interest.
In pursuing that important interest, the government cannot choose means
which unnecessarily burden the right to travel. 48 If there are other reasonable ways to achieve these goals with a lesser restriction on constitutionally
protected activity, these must be chosen instead of the way of greater interference. 49 Those classifications (legislative or otherwise) susceptible to
strict scrutiny under the compelling governmental interest test involve "suspect" areas-race, religion, color, and fundamental rights-marriage and
procreation, voting, first amendment rights, and as a result of Shapiro,
travel. 5 0
ProtectionAgainst Indirect Infringement
Prior to Shapiro, the right to travel was constitutionally protected but the
panoply accorded was against direct impingement thereon, not against encroachment which was indirect and incidental. In Shapiro there was no absolute proscription, but an indirect requirement was imposed in order to receive welfare once a person was within the state. A person was not prohibited from moving into the state because of the residency requirement, but
he was penalized because of his recent move. The decision in Shapiro did
not rest upon a finding that denial of welfare actually prevented travel. Nor
had other right to travel cases before the Supreme Court always relied on the
existence of actual restraint.51 The compelling state interest test will be
triggered by "any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that
right. '' 52 The Court's use of the right to travel in invalidating public welfare residency requirements expanded the scope of the doctrine in that previous travel cases had been more directly concerned with travel itself. The
compelling interest test may be invoked if there is an oblique infringement of
the right to travel, not just when there is direct infringement. Justice Warren objected to this extension of the right.
48. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 1330, 22 L. Ed. 2d
600, 613 (1969).

49. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S. Ct. 247, 252, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231,
237 (1960).

50. See Comment, The Right to Travel and Its Application to Restrictive Housing
Laws, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 635, 647 (1971).
51. E.g., Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 18 L. Ed. 744 (1868) where

the tax levied on persons leaving Nevada by commercial carrier was only $1-a
minimal deterrent to travel. The Court declared the tax unconstitutional and reasoned
that "if the State can tax a railroad passenger one dollar, it can tax him a thousand

dollars." Id. at 46, 18 L. Ed. at 748.
52. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 1331, 22 L. Ed. 2d

600, 615 (1969) (emphasis added). It has been made clear that the penalty does not
have to reach any specific level of deterrence to require application of the compelling
interest test. Carter v. Gallagher, 337 F. Supp. 626, 631 (D. Minn. 197.1).
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The Court's decision reveals only the top of the iceberg. Lurking beneath are the multitude of situations in which States have imposed residence requirements including eligibility to vote, to engage in certain professions or occupations or to attend a state-supported university. Although the Court takes pains to avoid acknowledging
the ramifications
53
of its decisions, its implications cannot be ignored.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Since the Shapiro decision, courts have applied the right to travel to a variety of fact situations which often only secondarily concern travel, but in
some fashion hamper the mobility of the population. The general issues to
be resolved are whether the restriction impedes or chills the right to travel
and, if so, whether there is a compelling interest to justify this limitation.
The difficult part of the puzzle that the courts must solve is what constitutes
a penalty on travel and what does not constitute a compelling governmental
interest.
It is firmly established that freedom of mobility is constitutionally protected as an implicit right which is assertable against private as well as governmental interference. 54 Travel within the United States has been restricted by riot statutes, curfews and other regulations employed during periods of domestic upheaval. These have been upheld as sufficiently necessary for the general welfare5 5 but ordinarily the exercise of police power
may not unreasonably infringe upon freedom of movement or freedom of
association. The liberty of every American citizen to come and go freely
must not be directly limited or suspended unless extraordinary or perilous
conditions exist. 56 This has recently been reemphasized where international
travel was prohibited. 51 The court held that given the necessity of passports for foreign travel, the mandatory requirement that all applicants swear
to or affirm an oath of allegiance is an unconstitutional abridgement of the
right to travel. 58
It has been made clear that it need not be shown that a restriction was
intended to prevent mobility or that it in fact had that effect. The penalty
53.

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 1342, 22 L. Ed. 2d

600, 627 (1969) (Warren, J., dissenting).
54. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 S. Ct. 1790, 29 L. Ed. 2d 338
(1971); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 86 S. Ct. 1170, 16 L. Ed. 2d 239
(1966).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 943 (1971); United States v. Matthews, 419 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
United States v. Hoffman, 334 F. Supp. 504 (D.D.C. 1971); Davis v. Justice Ct., 89
Cal. Rptr. 409 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
56. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 25, 85 S. Ct. 1271, 1285, 14 L. Ed. 2d 179, 195
(1965)

(Douglas, J., dissenting).

57. Woodward v. Rogers, 344 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1972).
58. Id. at 989.
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does not have to rise to any ascertainable level of deterrence to require application of the compelling governmental interest test. 59 In attempting to
delineate the scope of the right to travel, the courts, in recent decisions, have
had greater problems in determining whether or not something indirectly
impairs the right to travel. Since the majority in Shapiro implied no view
of the validity of other residency requirements, 0 there were many questions
left unanswered. Shapiro did not outlaw all residency requirements, but
neither did it provide criteria for determining requirements which are valid
and those which are not. Numerous decisions and dissenting opinions have
referred to the right to travel in challenging such residency requirements as
those imposed for voting, welfare, occupations and education.
Many actions have been brought challenging state durational residency
laws for voters. Vermont's 1-year residency requirement was held to penalize recent arrivals from other states and hamper their right to interstate
travel. 6 1 Likewise Massachusetts' additional 6-month residency requirement preceding elections violated the equal protection of persons who moved
to Massachusetts between 6 months and 1 year preceding a congressional
election. The statute was held unconstitutional as no compelling state interest is served by singling out interstate movers as a class of persons for
whom an additional 6 months is mandatory. 2 A statute providing that no
elector shall be deemed to have gained a residence while a student at any
institution of learning in Michigan placed a burden on the right of students to
vote and was held unconstitutional.03 The court noted that it is unconstitutional to deny the right to vote to students who exercise their right to travel
64
and leave for the summer.
The Supreme Court considered Tennessee's residency requirement for voting and held the durational requisites unconstitutional.65 The requirements
59. Carter v. Gallagher, 337 F. Supp. 626, 631 (D. Minn. 1971).
60. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 n.21, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 1333 n.21,
22 L. Ed. 2d 600, 617 n.21 (1969).
61. Kohn v. Davis, 320 F. Supp. 246 (D. Vt. 1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1034, 92
S. Ct. 1305, 31 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1972).
62. Burg v. Canniffe, 315 F. Supp. 380, 385 (D. Mass. 1970); accord, Woodsum
v. Boyd, 341 F. Supp. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Andrews v. Cody, 327 F. Supp. 793, 795
(D.N.C. 1971); Blumstein v. Ellington, 337 F. Supp. 323 (M.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 400
U.S. 816, 91 S. Ct. 67, 27 L. Ed. 2d 44 (1970); Keppel v. Donovan, 326 F. Supp. 15,
19 (D. Minn. 1970), a/I'd, 405 U.S. 1034, 92 S. Ct. 1304, 31 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1972);
Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107, 114 (M.D. Ala. 1970), a/I'd, 401 U.S. 968, 91
S. Ct. 1189, 28 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1971); Bufford v. Holton, 319 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Va.
1970); Lester v. Board of Elections, 319 F. Supp. 505 (D.D.C. 1970); Affeldt v.
Whitcomb, 319 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1970). Contra, Fontham v. McKeithen, 336
F. Supp. 153 (E.D. La. 1971); Ferguson v. Williams, 330 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Miss.
1971); Piliavin v. Hoel, 320 F. Supp. 66 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Howe v. Brown, 319 F.
Supp. 862 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Cocanower v. Marston, 318 F. Supp. 402 (D. Ariz.
1970).
63. Wilkins v. Bentley, 189 N.W.2d 423 (Mich. 1971).
64. Id. at 426 n.ll.
65. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S. Ct. 995, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1972).
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classified bona fide residents on the basis of recent travel, penalizing those
persons, and only those persons, who had gone from one jurisdiction to another during the qualifying period. This, the Court said, was a direct encroachment on the right to travel. 66 The Court did give some guidance for
the proper application of the compelling state interest test. Pointing out
that Shapiro did not rest upon a determination that denial of welfare actually
deterred travel, the Court reiterated that a law did not have to preclude or
restrain a right to be unconstitutional. 67 The two individual interests affected by the durational residence requirements are affected in different
ways: "Travel is permitted, but only at a price; voting is prohibited. The
right to travel is merely penalized, while the right to vote is absolutely denied."6' 8 These differences were said to be irrelevant since the Supreme
Court had already made it explicit:
It has long been established that a State may not impose a penalty upon
those who exercise a right guaranteed by the Constitution . . . "Constitutional rights would be of little value if they could be . . .indirectly
denied .... "69
The right to travel is then "'an unconditional personal right.'"70 Durational residency laws impermissibly condition and penalize the right of mobility by disenfranchising only those persons who have recently exercised that
right. Absent a compelling government interest, the right to travel may not
be burdened in this way. While dictating that courts decide whether the
relationship between the laws and legislative classification is too attenuated
to justify the burden upon fundamental rights, the Court noted that appropriately defined and uniformly applied bona fide residence requirements for
would-be voters were not necessarily invalid if the state shows an overriding
71
interest.
It should be noted that in the Federal Voting Rights Act, 72 Congress specifically stated that a durational residency requirement denies the inherent
right of citizens to enjoy free movement. The Supreme Court has used the
constitutionally protected right to travel to uphold the validity of the federal
voting rights statute enjoining states from disqualifying persons from voting
66. Id. at
67. Id. at
68. Id. at

-,
-,
-,

92 S. Ct. at 1001, 31 L. Ed. 2d at 282.
92 S. Ct. at 1002, 31 L. Ed. 2d at 283.
92 S. Ct. at 1002, 31 L. Ed. 2d at 284.

69. Id. at -, 92 S. Ct. at 1002, 31 L. Ed. 2d at 284, quoting Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540-41, 85 S. Ct. 1177, 1185, 14 L. Ed. 2d 50, 58 (1965).

70. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, -,

92 S. Ct. 995, 1003, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274,

284 (1972)

(court's emphasis).
Id. at - n.13, 92 S.Ct. at 1003 n.13, 31 L. Ed. 2d at 284 n.13.

One case
71.
interprets "travel," as discussed in Dunn, to mean "migration with intent to settle and
abide, not mere movement. Accordingly, a residency requirement where only the
right to travel is involved might not require the application of the compelling interest
test." Wellford v. Battaglia, 343 F. Supp. 143, 147 n.9 (D. Del. 1972).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-l(a)(2) (1970).
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in presidential elections because of failure to meet state residency requirements. 78 Although the majority did not agree on an opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, stated that by definition, a state's
imposition of a durational residency prescription penalized only those per74
sons who had exercised their constitutional right of interstate migration.
The state is required to show that the burden imposed was necessary to protect a substantial governmental interest and that no less intrusive means
would adequately protect compelling state interests. In an opinion by Justice
Stewart, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, it was stated
that the objective of the voting rights statute was a legitimate one, and Congress could justly conclude that the imposition of durational residency requirements unreasonably burdened the privilege of taking up residence in another
75
state.
Since Shapiro, the lower courts have consistently struck down all forms of
attempts to establish durational residency requirements for state and local
welfare. The first decision to follow Shapiro was Morrison v. Vincent 70
wherein the court very unwillingly declared unconstitutional a 1-year residency requirement for eligibility to receive welfare assistance. There is
an understandable fear of runaway expenditures for welfare relief, but the
attempt to erect fences to bar movement of people flies squarely in the face
of the Constitution which established the idea of one nation and one people.
It is quite clear that the public fise is not sufficient grounds to authorize a
residency statute which also has the effect of limiting the right of certain citizens to travel freely throughout the United States. 77
Residency requirements for medical aid to indigents have been closely
scrutinized and provisions which deny free medical care to indigents solely
on the basis that they had not resided in the county for a certain period have
been found unconstitutional.7 8 In light of Shapiro, an Arizona court held
unconstitutional a statute basing eligibility for nonemergency hospitalization
or out-patient relief upon residency in one county for the preceding 12
months. 79 This decision was vacated as moot but was directly followed by a
73.

Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 91 S. Ct. 260, 27 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1970).

74. Id. at 238, 91 S. Ct. at 321, 27 L. Ed. 2d at 346 (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
75. Id. at 286, 91 S. Ct. at 345, 27 L. Ed. 2d at 375.
76. 300 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.W. Va. 1969); accord, Demiragh v. De Vos, 337 F.
Supp. 483 (D. Conn. 1972); Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
afl'd, 397 U.S. 49, 90 S. Ct. 813, 25 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1970); Lopez v. Wyman, 329
F. Supp. 483 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), all'd, 404 U.S. -, 92 S. Ct. 736, 30 L. Ed. 2d 743

(1972).
77. Besaw v. Affleck, 333 F. Supp. 775 (D.R.I. 1971); Rivera v. Dunn, 329 F.
Supp. 554 (D. Conn. 1971).
78. E.g., Arnold v. Halifax Hosp. Dist., 314 F. Supp. 277 (M.D. Fla. 1970);
Crapps v. Duval County Hosp. Authority, 314 F. Supp. 181 (M.D. Fla. 1970).

79. Board of Supervisors v. Robinson, 457 P.2d 951 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969), vacated
as moot, 463 P.2d 536 (Ariz. 1970).
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federal district court's construction of the same statute.8 0
Recent cases regarding admission requirements for public housing have
involved significant utilizations of the right to travel. King v. New Rochelle
Municipal Housing Authority8 l and Cole v. Housing Authoritys2 were two
very similar public housing cases which held residency requirements unconstitutional in light of Shapiro. The waiting periods for public housing were
imposed solely because the applicants had recently migrated into the stateSuch domiciliary requisites have been found to constitute a very real inhibition
upon the right to travel. It was stated that the residency requirement
tends directly to inhibit freedom of movement and indirectly to diminish
familial and consensual associations of persons. It has long been recognized that the basic human right to geographic mobility, either in pursuit
of preferred associations and opportunities s3or merely seeking a change
in environment, is constitutionally protected.
Another federal district court refused to use the travel doctrine to invalidate
a durational residency for public housing because of the insubstantiality of
84
the impact of the classification on the right to travel.
The courts have found that the reasoning in Shapiro may be equally applicable to residency requirements relating to employment or the practice of a
profession or trade. For example, the North Carolina rule requiring a person
to have a been a bona fide citizen and resident of the state for 12 months
before he can take the bar examination was declared unconstitutional as
imposing a burden on the right to interstate travel without being necessary
to promote a substantial state interest.8 5 Other states have upheld rules re80. Valenciano v. Bateman, 323 F. Supp. 600 (D. Ariz. 1971). However, a different result was reached in a later case which held that the residency requirement for
nonemergency treatment in a county hospital does not interfere with interstate travel.
Maricopa County v. Superior Court, 498 P.2d 461 (Ariz. 1972). Another statute
permitting hospital superintendents to return nonresident inmates of a state hospital to
states of their residence was held unconstitutional in its deterrence of the right to
travel despite the fact that it did not require a return and had been administered
benevolently. Vaughan v. Bower, 313 F. Supp. 37, 42 (D. Ariz. 1970), alrd, 400
U.S. 884, 91 S. Ct. 139, 27 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1970). The court held that Shapiro was
dispositive of the situation in that an invidious classification was created which penalized
the right to travel and no compelling state interest was shown. But see In re Reitz,
191 N.W.2d 913 (Wis. 1971) where a statute authorizing removal of a dependent person who is receiving relief elsewhere was upheld.
81. King v. New Rochelle Mun. Housing Authority, 314 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), af['d, 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971).
82. Cole v. Housing Authority, 312 F. Supp. 692 (D.R.I.), a!I'd, 435 F.2d 807
(lst Cir. 1970).
83. Cole v. Housing Authority, 312 F. Supp. 692, 701 (D.R.I. 1970).
84. Lane v. McGarry, 320 F. Supp. 562 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
85. Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970)
where the court noted:
Although the Fourteenth Amendment is but a centenarian, the concepts of equal
treatment for recent arrivals is at least as old as the Mosaic Law. "One shall be
to him that is homeborn, and unto the stranger that sojournth among you."
Exodus 12:49 (King James).
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quiring durational residency before admission to the bar since they did not
unduly penalize the right to interstate travel. 86
Residency requirements for certain occupations have also been challenged
as impinging on the right to travel. The New Hampshire Supreme Court
held invalid a Manchester ordinance that required school teachers to be
residents of that city.8 7 This prescription was said to require a surrender of
the fundamental constitutional right of a citizen to live where he chooses
and to travel freely not only within the state but also across its borders. 88
Another state statute providing that the registration of a real estate broker shall be revoked if the registrant has become a nonresident was held invalid since the right of citizens to be free to travel may be restricted only for a
compelling state interest.89 However, not every interference with the right
to travel necessitates voiding the occupational regulation. A statute which
required a policeman or fireman to surrender his constitutional right to travel
in exchange for his job was found to be justified by a substantial and a compelling regulatory scheme.9 0
A city charter provision requiring a 2-year residency in the city as a prerequisite of eligibility to hold elective office penalized the right to travel
without furthering the city's interest and was therefore held unconstitutional. 91 However another county charter's 5-year residency requirement for
candidates for office of county supervisor does not constitute a violation of
the potential candidate's constitutional right to travel. 9 2 One court mentioned that the prerequisite that one own property in order to be a political
candidate possibly runs afoul of the right to travel. 93 A person desiring to be
free to travel and not encumbered by the restraints of property ownership
may still meet all the requirements of residency.
Various other residency requirements have been said to infringe upon the
right to travel. A 4-month residency requirement as a prerequisite to obId. at 1358 n.10; accord, Smith v. Davis, 350 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.W. Va. 1972);
Potts v. Honorable Justices of Supreme Court, 332 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Hawaii 1971);
Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Webster v. Wofford, 321
F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
86. E.g., Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.M. 1972), aff'd sub. nom.,

Rose v. Bondurant, 41 U.S.L.W. 3287 (U.S. Nov. 21, 1972); Application of Brown,
191 N.E.2d 812 (Va. 1972); Application of Titus, 191 N.E.2d 798 (Va. 1972).
87. Donnelly v. City of Manchester, 274 A.2d 789 (N.H. 1971).
88. Id. at 791; see Purdy v. Fitzpatrick, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969) (invalidating
a statute prohibiting employment of aliens).
89. Hall v. King, 266 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1972). 'See also State v. Johnston, 456
P.2d 805, 814 n.4 (Hawaii 1969) (dissenting opinion).
90. Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972).
91. Green v. McKeon, 468 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1972); accord, Wellford v. Battaglia,
343 F. Supp. 143 (D. Del. 1972).

92. Zeilenga v. Nelson, 90 Cal. Rptr. 916 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970) where the court

nonetheless invalidated the residency requirement.
93. Sorenson v. Bellingham, 496 P.2d 512 (Wash. 1972).
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taining a therapeutic abortion under the North Carolina abortion statute
unconstitutionally limited the right to travel. 94 A residency requirement for
divorce in Wisconsin has been invalidated since it is impermissible for a
state to attempt to chill an individual's constitutional right to travel by seeking to deter individuals with marital problems from entering the state. 95 Apparently statutes which require a person to live within a particular state will
not be allowed. A California provision which punished nonsupporting fathers who remain out of the state for more than 30 days as felons while only
punishing nonsupporting fathers who remain within the state as misdemeanants was invalidated. This classification was held to be violative of equal
protection rights in that it penalized the exercise of the fundamental right to
travel. 9 6 Such a goal-to cause individuals to move into or remain in a state
-lacks constitutional sanction because it violates the person's right to choose
his own domicile and to travel freely throughout the country.
The right to travel has been discussed in situations other than those where
durational residency requirements were challenged and the freedom of mobility has been safeguarded by the same standard. The right to travel encompasses intrastate movement as well as interstate since there appears to
be no valid distinction between interstate and intrastate travel. To the extent that the right to mobility arises from our consitutional concepts of personal liberty, it does not hinge on the crossing of state lines, but encompasses
movement within a state as well. It would be senseless to acknowledge the
right to travel between states as a fundamental tenet of personal liberty and
not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state.
"The right of any person to travel interstate irrespective of race, creed or
color is protected by the Constitution. Certainly his right to travel intra97
state is as basic.
The constitutional right to travel from one state to another and necessarily use the highways and other instrumentalities in doing so occupies a
position fundamental to the concept of our federal union. 98 The right to
drive an automobile is integrally bound up in the right to travel guaranteed
by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution and an action
which required suspension of a driver's license without the privilege of review was held unconstitutional. 99 The right of a citizen to drive on a public
street without interference from the police, unless he is engaged in suspicious
94. Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
95. Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Wis. 1971). Contra, Whitehead v. Whitehead, 492 P.2d 939 (Hawaii 1972); Coleman v. Coleman, 291 N.E.2d
530 (Ohio 1972).
96. In re King, 90 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971).
97. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 255, 84 S. Ct. 1814, 1830, 12 L. Ed. 2d 822,
875 (1964) (citations omitted) (court's emphasis).
98. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 86 S. Ct. 1170, 16 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1966).
99. Miller v. Depuy, 307 F. Supp. 166, 172 (E.D. Pa. 1969),
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conduct associated with criminality, is a fundamental constitutional right
which must be protected by the court. 100 However, the right to travel does
not include an unlimited right to drive upon highways. 10 1
Once a transgression of a constitutional right has been found, the compelling interest test almost assures a finding of unconstitutionality.10 2 However, insome cases residency requirements and other restrictions have been
upheld because they do not infringe on the right to travel or because they
further compelling governmental interests.
It is thus seen that the compelling government interest test, an approach
traditionally used in first amendment cases, is also applied to a freedom not
mentioned in the Constitution-the right to travel. This test can be satisfied
by showing that there is an overriding interest even though the right to travel
is infringed upon. The fact that a freedom may not be restrained without due
process of law does not mean that it can never be restricted.103 For instance,
areas devastated by flood, fire or epidemic can be quarantined when it can
be demonstrated that unlimited travel to the area would jeopardize the
safety and welfare of the area or the nation as a whole.' 0 4 International
travel may be similarly restricted. Regardless of whether it is in the national interest of the United States to provide its citizens with the greatest
freedom of world-wide movement, during periods of international hostilities
or national emergency this freedom may be reasonably inhibited. 10 5
"Travel, once tainted by illegality, loses any constitutional significance."' 0 6
Congress may proscribe the use of interstate facilities to effect an illegal purpose. 0 7 When travel involves the use of an interstate facility for illicit purposes, the constitutional right of mobility is subordinated to the congressional
100. People v. Horton, 92 Cal. Rptr. 666 (Dist. Ct. App. 1971); see Medrano v.
Allee, 347 F. Supp. 605 (S.D. Tex. 1972) where a statute making it an offense to
willfully obstruct any public street or highway was upheld over charges that travel is
permitted only at the whim of officers.
101. One may be prevented from driving while intoxicated. E.g., People v. Brown,
485 P.2d 500 (Colo. 1971). There is also no constitutional right to flee the scene of
an accident to avoid the possibility of legal involvement. California v. Byers, 402
U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 1535, 29 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1971).
102. See Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare and the Constitution, 44
N.Y.U.L. REV.989, 1004 (1969).
103. Woodward v. Rogers, 344 F. Supp. 974, 986-87 (D.D.C. 1972).
104. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15-16, 85 S. Ct. 1271, 1280, 14 L. Ed. 2d 179, 189
(1965).
105. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 85 S. Ct. 1271, 14 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1965).
106. United States v. Gerhart, 275 F. Supp. 443, 451 (S.D.W. Va. 1967) (citation
omitted).
107. Turf Center, Inc. v. United States, 325 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1964); see United
States v. Johnson, 149 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 722 (1945) (affirming
a conviction for supplying dentures through interstate commerce without a license);
Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 33 S.Ct. 281, 57 L. Ed. 523 (1913) (affirming
a conviction for transporting prostitutes); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 23 S.Ct.
321, 47 L. Ed. 492 (1903) (lottery case).
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power of regulation of interstate commerce.108 Accordingly a statute making
it an offense to travel in interstate or foreign commerce or to use any facility
in that commerce with the intent of furthering unlawful activity does not
violate the constitutional right to travel. 10 9 This statute interferes only with
travel and speech which aid unlawful activities and not at all with travel for
legitimate purposes. A statute prohibiting a person from engaging in an illegal gambling business does not unconstitutionally intrude on a gambler's
right to travel from a state in which gambling is legal into an anti-gambling
state without a loss of his profession. 1 10 Similarly a statute making it unlawful to travel interstate with the intent to organize, promote and participate in a riot does not violate the right of freedom to travel throughout the
union.

11 1

Curfew laws may restrict movement even within a person's own neighborhood. Individuals may reasonably fear that the exercise of the right to use
the public streets to obtain food, to go to work or to locate their families
will expose them to arrest on a serious criminal charge."12 A citywide curfew imposed by the mayor because of racial disturbance was attacked by
militants because it restricted citizens' right to travel. The court agreed that
the curfew was restrictive; but freedom of travel like freedom of speech may
be subject to reasonable limitations as to time and place." 3 Other courts
have recognized that curfew laws interfered with the right to travel but that
their purpose of preventing violence was a justifiable compelling interest.
It is true that a curfew, restricting as it does the right of free movement,
does interfere with what ordinarily is a right of the citizenry. Obviously,
the right to free movement cannot be interfered with unless extraordinary and perilous conditions exist, such as a riot, and perhaps only one
of formidable dimensions . ... 114
Even though vagrancy statutes place a limitation on the right to travel,
they have generally been upheld as a proper utilization of police power. In
a prosecution for violation of a statute providing that a person is guilty of
loitering when he remains or wanders in or about a place without apparent
108. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320-23, 33 S. Ct. 281, 283, 57 L. Ed. 523,
526-27 (1913); United States v. Johnson, 149 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 722 (1945).
109. United States v. Corallo, 281 F. Supp. 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Gilstrap v. United
States, 389 F.2d 6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968).
110. United States v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 345 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. La. 1972).
111. United States v. Hoffman, 334 F. Supp. 504 (D.D.C. 1971).
112. United States v. Matthews, 419 F.2d 1177, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (dissenting opinion).
113. United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 943 (1972).
A
114. Davis v. Justice Court, 89 Cal. Rptr. 409, 414 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
District of Columbia riot statute which imposed a curfew was upheld over constitutional challenges even though it interfered with movement within the community.
United States v. Matthews, 419 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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reason and under circumstances which justify suspicion that he may be about
to engage in a crime, the statute was said to be a reasonable restriction in
that it was related to the public good." 5 But the exercise of police power
may not unreasonably infringe upon freedom of movement nor freedom of
association. Where an effort to prophylactically stamp as criminal what has
not yet erupted into a crime affects freedom of movement and expression,
the state will be denied the restriction. Thus a New Jersey statute prohibiting persons from going to or being present at a place within the state for unlawful purposes was held void."16
While many courts have disallowed durational residency requirements,
as previously mentioned, some have specifically permitted them. Those decisions upholding durational residency requirements generally avoided following Shapiro by relying on a footnote to the case:
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence require-

ments in determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and so
forth. Such requirements may promote compelling state interests on
the one hand, or, on the other, may not be penalties upon the exercise

of the constitutional right of interstate travel. 17
Ohio's residency requirement for voter eligibility was held not to impinge
upon the constitutional right to move freely interstate." 8 Louisiana's statute
imposing a 1-year residency requirement for voting was afforded the presumption of constitutionality, and this presumption was not overcome by the
plaintiff's assertions that the statute restricted the right to travel and to
vote. 1 9 The court did not follow Shapiro because it felt that durational
residency requirements could not realistically be regarded as an attempt to
penalize the free movement of voters. Other courts have refused to use
the compelling interest test and have upheld their states' traditional residency
20
requirements since they satisfied the rational relation standard.'
115. People v. Taggart, 320 N.Y.S.2d 671 (Dist. Ct. 1971); see Lessard v. Schmidt,
349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
116. Karp v. Collins, 310 F. Supp. 627 (D.N.J. 1970).
117. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 n.21, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 1333 n.21,
22 L. Ed. 2d 600, 617 n.21 (1969).
118. Howe v. Brown, 319 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
119. Fontham v. McKeithen, 336 F. Supp. 153, 157 (E.D. La. 1971).
120. E.g., Ferguson v. Williams, 330 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Piliavin v.
Hoel, 320 F. Supp. 66 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Cocanower v. Marston, 318 F. Supp. 402
(D. Ariz. 1970). Contra, Woodsum v. Boyd, 341 F. Supp. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1972);
Andrews v. Cody, 327 F. Supp. 793 (M.D.N.C. 1971); Blumstein v. Ellington, 337 F.
Supp. 323 (M.D. Tenn.), afI'd, 400 U.S. 816, 91 S. Ct. 67, 27 L. Ed. 2d 44 (1970);
Keppel v. Donovan, 326 F. Supp. 15 (D. Minn. 1970), a!f'd, 405 U.S. 1034, 92 S. Ct.
1304, 31 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1972); Kohn v. Davis, 320 F. Supp. 246 (D. Vt. 1970), aff'd,
405 U.S. 1034, 92 S. Ct. 1305, 31 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1972); Hadnott v. Amos, 320
F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970), afl'd, 401 U.S. 968, 91 S. Ct. 1189, 28 L. Ed. 2d 318
(1971); Bufford v. Holton, 319 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Va. 1970); Lester v. Board of
Elections, 319 F. Supp. 505 (D.D.C. 1970); Affeldt v. Whitcomb, 319 F. Supp. 69
(N.D. Ind. 1970); Burg v. Canniffe, 315 F. Supp. 380, 385 (D. Mass. 1970).
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A residency requirement for divorce has been upheld in Hawaii under the
121
strict standard applicable when a statute impinges upon the right to travel.
Likewise, Ohio's requirements that the plaintiff in a divorce proceeding be
a resident of the state for 1 year prior to the filing of a complaint does not
unconstitutionally penalize the right to free travel. 122 The privilege of obtaining a divorce is not a basic need nor supported by any urgent necessity
and there is no evidence that the residency requirement prevents persons
wanting a divorce from entering the state.
Some courts have upheld the constitutionality of statutes that impose durational residency requirements for relief benefits since they promote a state
interest of an overriding nature. 123 It has also been held that a claimant's
right to travel was not unreasonably violated by a provision conditioning
eligibility for unemployment benefits on his being available (within the
state) for work.' 2 4 The claimants had moved to Puerto Rico and had requested that their relief benefits be mailed to them. The court held that the
state had an overriding interest and could therefore impose this restriction on
the claimant's mobility.' 25 A federal court refused to invalidate a durational residency requirement for public housing because the right was not
penalized to any great degree. The court decided that just because someone
or a few persons might refrain from traveling because of it, the classification
a penalty being imposed upon the exercise of
does not necessarily result in
26
the right of interstate travel.1
The New Mexico Supreme Court upheld a rule requiring a 6-month residency before admission to the bar since it did not unduly penalize the right
to interstate travel. 127 Similarly the Virginia rule that requires attorneyapplicants to be permanent residents of the state and avow the intention to
121. Whitehead v. Whitehead, 492 P.2d 939 (Hawaii 1972).
122. Coleman v. Coleman, 291 N.E.2d 530 (Ohio 1972).
v. Syman, 328 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Wis. 1971).

Contra, Wymelenberg

123. Maricopa County v. Superior Court, 498 P.2d 461 (Ariz. 1972); accord, Pease

v. Hansen, 483 P.2d 720 (Mont. 1971), rev'd per curiam, 404 U.S. 70, 92 S. Ct. 318,
30 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1971). But see Demiragh v. De Vos, 337 F. Supp. 483 (D. Conn.
1972); Lopez v. Wyman, 329 F. Supp. 483 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 404 U.S. -, 92 S. Ct.
736, 30 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1972); Valenciano v. Bateman, 323 F. Supp. 600 (D. Ariz.
1971); Vaughan v. Bower, 313 F. Supp. 37 (D. Ariz. 1970), alf'd, 400 U.S. 884, 91
S. Ct. 139, 27 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1970); Arnold v. Halifax Hosp. Dist., 314 F. Supp. 277
(M.D. Fla. 1970); Crapps v. Duval County Hosp. Authority, 314 F. Supp. 181 (M.D.

Fla. 1970); Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), a! 'd, 397 U.S. 49,
90 S. Ct. 813, 25 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1970); Morrison v. Vincent, 300 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.W.
Va. 1969); Board of Supervisors v. Robinson, 457 P.2d 951 (Ariz. Ct. App.), vacated
as moot, 463 P.2d 536 (Ariz. 1970).
124. Patino v. Catherwood, 327 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1971); Abreu v. Levine, 326 N.Y.S.2d

104 (1971).
125. Patino v. Catherwood, 327 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1971); Abreu v. Levine, 326 N.Y.S.2d

104 (1971).
126. Lane v. McGarry, 320 F. Supp. 562 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).

127. Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.M. 1972), aff'd sub. nom., Rose

v. Bondurant, 41 U.S.L.W. 3287 (U.S. Nov. 21, 1972).
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practice full time in the state does not abridge the right to travel.1 28 This
rule was challenged as violating the applicant's freedom to travel, but the
court refused to apply the compelling state interest test. It was stated that
the Supreme Court had invalidated only the waiting period of residency and
did not eliminate the basic meaning of residence defined in terms of intent
1 29
to remain in the jurisdiction.
College students have asserted the right to travel to no avail in challenging
regulations which deny certain educational benefits on the basis of residency.
Rules requiring a specified residency before being able to qualify for resident tuition have been found not to be an infringement of the fundamental
right to travel, the constitutionality of the statute being judged upon the basis
of whether the distinction drawn by the regulation has some rational relation to a legitimate state interest.' 3 0 In a California case, the 1-year residency requirement for lower tuition at a state university was held not to infringe on the right to travel.'' The court denied that travel had been penalized as in Shapiro since charging higher tuition fees to nonresident students apparently cannot be equated with the granting of basic subsistence to
one class of needy residents while denying it to an equally needy class of
residents. Furthermore the domiciliary requirement did not deter any appreciable number of persons from moving into the state.'3 2 Similarly, parietal regulations of state-supported institutions of higher education requiring
undergraduates to live on campus was not held unconstitutional as a result of
a class action suit even though it was an apparent restraint on the rights of
students to come and go as they please. 3 A 1-year residency requirement
for loans has also been upheld under attacks that denial of a loan based on a
durational residency requirement impairs students' constitutionally protected
right to travel.' 3 4 Apparently, since assistance for education does not constitute such a fundamental aspect of basic survival and subsistence, its denial
is not considered of sufficient magnitude as to discourage or prevent interstate travel. However, a high school student was successful in having a
rule of an Indiana high school association declared invalid. The provision
denied participation in interschool athletics until a 1-year residency requirement had been met and it was declared to be an unconstitutional burden on
13 5
the right to travel.
128. Application of Brown, 191 S.E.2d 812 (Va. 1972); Application of Titus, 191
N.E.2d 798 (Va. 1972).
129. Application of Titus, 191 S.E.2d 798, 800 (Va. 1972).
130. Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 985,
91 S. Ct. 1231, 28 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1971); accord, Thompson v. Board of Regents,
188 N.W.2d 840 (Neb. 1971).
131. Kirk v. Board of Regents, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
132. Id. at 266.
133. Pratz v. Louisiana Polytechnic Inst., 316 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. La. 1970).
134. Clark v. Hammer, 342 F. Supp. 855 (D. Conn. 1972).
135. Sturrup v. Mahan, 290 N.E.2d 64 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972).
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Other regulations which seem to promote overriding governmental interests have been upheld since the effect on the right to travel is negligible.
Freedom of mobility is said not to be significantly impeded by: a statute
which regulates the sale of firearms to a nonresident; 136 exclusion of piecework farm laborers from coverage under Workmen's Compensation;' 8 7 a
city ordinance making it unlawful to rent to anyone under age 18 ;1 s a local
airport authority's use and service charge of $1 for each passenger boarding
commercial aircraft. 139 The fact that a child was committed to an institution
within the state, after he was found to be dependent and delinquent, did not
abridge the privilege of the mother to move freely from state to state even
though she had moved to the state only 2 months prior to the juvenile hearing.'

40

CONCLUSION

While Shapiro added definition to the recurrent discussion of freedom of
mobility, unanimity is lacking in recent decisions regarding the significance
and range of the right to travel. Still, a majority of the courts have employed the compelling interest test and have zealously guarded the right to
travel. There is a common understanding that freedom of movement is a
personal liberty that should not be restricted except in exigent circumstances.
The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own
good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of
theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it .

. .

. Mankind are greater

gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good4 to themselves, than
by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.1 1
136. United States v. Lebman, 464 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41
U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1972).
137. Gallegos v. Glaser Crandell, 192 N.W.2d 52 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
138. Ames v. City of Hermosa Beach, 93 Cal. Rptr. 786 (Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
139. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405
U.S. 707, 92 S. Ct. 1349, 31 L. Ed. 2d 620 (1972). Contra, Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Joint City-County Airport Bd., 463 P.2d 470 (Mont. 1970).
Justice Douglas pointed out that Evansville was governed by Crandall v. Nevada,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 18 L. Ed. 744 (1867), which struck down a state law levying a
$1 tax on every person leaving the state by common carrier. He said that Crandall
must be overruled in order to uphold the $1 tax in Evansville. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, -, 92 S. Ct. 1349,
1358, 31 L. Ed. 2d 620, 632 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
140. In re Henderson, 199 N.W.2d 111 (Iowa 1972).
141. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 12-13 (1859).
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